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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






ROBERT L. GARY, JR., 




WORKER'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD OF PA;  
COMMISSIONERS OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION APPEALS  
BOARD; SANDRA CRAWFORD; JAMES ZURICK; JUDGE  
BEVERLY J. DONEKER, Dept. of Labor and Industry;  
J.D. ECKMAN INC.; PHILIP C. KEIDEL, CNA Insurance Co’s. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-19-cv-00961) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 10, 2019 
Before:  KRAUSE, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 







                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Robert Gary, Jr., appeals from the order of the District Court dismissing his 
complaint.  We will affirm. 
I. 
This appeal concerns at least the third federal civil action that Gary has filed pro se 
relating to his Pennsylvania state workers’ compensation proceeding.  By way of 
background, in 2007 a Workers’ Compensation Judge (“WCJ”) approved a settlement 
between Gary and his former employer under which Gary received a lump-sum payment 
of $140,000.  In 2013, Gary began seeking additional compensation.  After multiple 
hearings and series of appeals and remands, the WCJ ultimately denied Gary’s requests in 
2017.  In 2018, both the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board and the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court affirmed.  See Gary v. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. (J.D. Eckman, 
Inc.), No. 581 C.D. 2018, 2018 WL 6314214, at *6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 4, 2018), 
appeal denied, No. 2 MAL 2019, 2019 WL 3297355 (Pa. July 23, 2019). 
Gary filed his first federal action addressed to these proceedings in 2013 in the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania.  (M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1-13-cv-02540.)  Among the 
defendants he named were the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry and 
members of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board.  He claimed that the defendants 
violated his due process and equal protection rights because, among other things, his 
signature on the 2007 settlement agreement “was obtained fraudulently.”  He also 
claimed that the process afforded him had been deficient in various respects.  The District 
Court dismissed that complaint on the grounds that certain defendants were entitled to  
sovereign immunity and that Gary otherwise failed to state a claim.  Gary did not appeal. 
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Gary filed his next federal action in 2019, this time in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  (E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 5-19-02068.)  He again named as defendants the 
Department and the Board, and he added his former employer and the WCJ.  Gary 
asserted in conclusory fashion that the defendants conspired to deny him due process and 
equal protection in violation of his rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  In particular, he again complained that the WCJ erred in approving the 
2007 settlement and that defendants had otherwise denied him a “full and fair hearing” 
and committed an “abuse of process.”  For relief, he requested monetary damages along 
with “reinstatement of benefits and dismissal of all decisions and orders from [2007] till 
present.”   
The District Court dismissed that complaint with prejudice as frivolous and for 
failure to state a claim under the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(i) 
and (ii).  In doing so, the District Court concluded (among other things) that Gary’s 
claims were untimely, that the WCJ was entitled to judicial immunity, and that Gary’s 
allegations were otherwise too conclusory to state a plausible claim.  Once again, Gary 
did not appeal.1 
Instead, about three weeks later, Gary filed in the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
                                              
1 After the District Court dismissed Gary’s complaint, he filed a “motion for stay or 
injunction pursuant to Rule 8(a),” but he did not file a notice of appeal.  The District 
Court treated that motion as one for reconsideration and denied it on June 13, 2019.  
Gary’s 30-day period to appeal expired on July 15, 2019 (July 13 being a Saturday).  See 




the complaint at issue here.  His complaint was virtually identical to the one that the 
Eastern District Court had just dismissed, and he both named the same defendants and 
sought the same relief.  Among other things, Gary continued to complain of the 2007 
settlement and to assert in conclusory fashion that the defendants conspired to deprive 
him of his due process and equal protection rights.   
The District Court, acting on a Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, dismissed 
Gary’s complaint with prejudice under the in forma pauperis statute and Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).  The District Court concluded, among other things, that Gary’s complaint was 
barred by res judicata by reason of his Eastern District action.  Gary now appeals.2 
II. 
Gary raises two arguments that we will briefly address.  First, he challenges the 
District Court’s application of res judicata.  We agree with the District Court that Gary’s 
complaint was barred by res judicata,3 however, and we will affirm its ruling on that 
basis.  Gary’s present complaint is barred by res judicata because there has been “(1) a 
                                              
2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
dismissals on res judicata grounds.  See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 
172 (3d Cir. 2009).  Because we will affirm on that ground as explained below, we need 
not address whether and to what extent Gary’s claims are barred by the jurisdictional 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Hoffman v. Nordic Nats., Inc., 837 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 
2016) (holding that federal courts need not assure themselves of subject matter 
jurisdiction before applying res judicata, also called claim preclusion).  Our affirmance 
on res judicata grounds also means that we do not reach the merits of Gary’s claims.  We 
nevertheless note that Gary’s conclusory allegations of insufficient process appear to be 
belied by the Commonwealth Court’s extensive discussion of the extensive process 
afforded him, which included five hearings.  See Gary, 2018 WL 6314214, at *1-4.   
 
3 The Magistrate Judge invoked both res judicata and collateral estoppel, but his 
discussion focused on the latter.  We focus on the former. 
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final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies 
and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.”  Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 
F.3d 333, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted).  In particular, all of the 
events of which Gary complains had transpired when he filed his virtually identical 
complaint against the same defendants in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which the 
District Court dismissed with prejudice.  Thus, Gary either raised or could have raised all 
of his present claims in that proceeding.   
Gary asserts that his present claims are not barred by res judicata because 
defendants violated his rights.  Res judicata, however, addresses the multiplicity of 
lawsuits, not their merits.  See Hoffman, 837 F.3d at 277.  If Gary believed that his 
claims had merit, his remedy was to appeal after the Eastern District Court dismissed his 
complaint, not to simply file another one with a different court.  Indeed, Gary’s filing of 
his present complaint would not have prevented the Eastern District’s dismissal from 
becoming final for res judicata purposes even if that court had granted leave to amend, 
which it did not.  See id. at 279-80. 
Second, Gary argues that he did not consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
Magistrate Judge and that the District Court failed to adequately review the Magistrate 
Judge’s report.  The Magistrate Judge, however, was authorized to issue his 
recommendation upon the District Court’s referral under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).  And 
even though the District Court could have addressed Gary’s objections more 
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specifically,4 any error in that regard was harmless because our plenary review confirms 
that the District Court properly dismissed the complaint on the basis of res judicata.  See 
Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011).   
III. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
4 The District Court declined to write separately because it concluded that Gary had filed 
only general objections that merely restated facts and arguments presented in his 
complaint.  In fact, Gary raised a specific legal objection that was relevant to the 
application of res judicata.  Gary argued that the Eastern District lacked “jurisdiction” 
over his complaint, and res judicata applies only when there has been a prior judgment by 
a court of “competent jurisdiction.”  Hubicki v. ACF Indus., Inc., 484 F.2d 519, 524 (3d 
Cir. 1973) (quotation marks omitted).  Gary has not repeated that argument on appeal 
and, even if he had, we would reject it.  In his Eastern District action, as in this one, Gary 
asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other federal statutes that defendants violated 
his federal rights.  Thus, the Eastern District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
